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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE DOCTRINE OF BAILEY v. AUSTRIAN
By THOMAS CLAFFEY LAVERY*
W HEN a court of last resort in an early case has reached
a conclusion which is out of line with authorities else-
where, a question arises, is that decision sound; and, assuming
for the moment that it is not sound, at least two further questions
may be asked: first, has the court in like cases persisted in or
has it changed its position; and second, if there has been change,
how and to what extent has it occurred?
In 1873 the supreme court of Minnesota decided Bailcy v.
Austrian.' The facts of the case were simple and the prin-
ciple governing them familiar; yet -the court in applying that
principle came to a conclusion contra to that generally reached
by courts of other jurisdictions.2  The action was for breach
of contract. Plaintiffs offered evidence which, according to the
court, would have tended to establish (had it been admitted be-
low) that defendant -promised to supply and plaintiffs simul-
taneously promised to buy at specified prices all the pig-iron
their foundry might want during a certain period. A quantity
of pig-iron was furnished, but before the period had expired
defendant stopped deliveries and refused to supply any. more
although requested by plaintiffs to do so. In holding that the
evidence offered was properly excluded on the ground that if it
had been admitted it would not have established a contract be-
tween the parties, the court said:
. . If this state of facts establishes any contract, it is
a contract of nutial promises; that is to say, the sole considera-
tion for defendant's promise to* supply is plaintiffs' promise to
purchase, and vice versa.
"The general rule . . . is 'that a promise is not a good
consideration for a promise, unless there is an absolute mutuality
of engagement, so that each party has the right at once to hold
the other to a positive agreement.' 1 Parsons, Cont. 449, and
note z.
. . . the engagement of plaintiffs was to purchase all
of said pig-iron which they might want in their said business
during the time specified; but they do not engage to want any
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1(1873) 19 Minn. 535 (Gil. 465).
21 Williston on Contracts, sec. 104, note 84.
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quantity whatever. They do not even engage to continue their
business. If they see fit to discontinue it on the very day on
which the supposed agreement is entered into, they are at entire
liberty to do so at their own option, and, whatever might have
been defendant's expectation, he is without remedy. In other
words, there is -no absolute engagement on plaintiffs' part to
'want,' and of course no absolute engagement to purchase any
iron of defendant.
"Without such absolute engagement on plaintiffs' part, there
is "no absolute mutuality of engagement,' so that defendant 'has
the right at once to hold' plaintiffs 'to a positive agreement.' . . .
"To be a sufficient consideration it is necessary that plaintiffs'
promise be a benefit to defendant or an injury to plaintiffs. 1
Parsons, Cont. 431. But so long as . . . plaintiffs are not
bound to do anything whatever by virtue of their promise, the
promise cannot be such benefit or injury."
For the purpose of this discussion it can do no harm to ad-
mit, as the court has done in a recent case,3 the invulnerability
of the major premise under which the conclusion in Bailey v.
Austrian was reached, and to announce at the outset that the
object of our attack is to be the minor premise. The reason,
said the court, why the promise of the buyer was not sufficient
consideration to support the promise of the seller was because
the buyer did not bind himself to a positive agreement. If, in-
deed, this was the case of course there could be no "absolute
mutuality of engagement." Yet for some time the parties in
Bailey v. Austrian thought they had made a oinding contract-
some pig-iron was actually delivered under the terms of the sup-
p6sed agreement. As a bilateral contract, in what respect did
it fail?
The opinion of the court plainly shows that Bailey v. Aus-
trin was decided solely upon a consideration of the language
used by the parties to express the terms of their agreement. In
particular the use of the word want by the buyer was stressed,
and it has been suggested that the decision turned thereon.
4
By agreeing to buy all the pig-iron he might want during a speci-
fied period, what did the buyer mean? Where a contract is ex-
plicit, the primary rule is that a term will be interpreted in its
common or normal meaning unless some reason appears for at-
3City of Marshall v. Kalman, (1922) 153 Minn. 320, 324, 190 N. W.
597.
'National Furnace Company v. Keystone Manufacturing Co., (1884)
110 Ill. 427, 434; Hickey v. O'Brien, (1900) 123 Mich. 611, 82 N. W. 241
49 L. R. A. 594, 81 A. S. 1? 227.
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taching a special meaning to it.' The dictionary' nearest
at hand says that want may mean wish for or desire, and this
was apparently the interpretation the court gave it. So inter-
preted, was its conclusion correct?
Since this discussion is not intended to involve the nature
of the element of consideration in the formation of simple con-
tracts, let us adopt the court's description of that element as our
own. The buyer's promise must be a benefit to the seller or an
injury (detriment) to himself before it can constitute sufficient
consideration. Obviously this can never be the case where the
buyer -by promising to buy what he wants to buy means that he
will qbuy merely that quantity of pig-iron which he wishes or
desires to buy, since he has promised nothing which can be either
beneficial or detrimental when measured ,by prevailing legal
standards.- If his inclination to buy is not motivated by
something more compelling than his whim of the moment, no
benefit to the seller nor injury to the buyer can be predicated on
such a promise. In other words, by reserving, as the court says,
the privilege of doing as he pleases, the buyer neither confers a
benefit upon the seller nor imposes a detriment upon himself, and,
therefore, does not become subject to a contractual obligation.
The word want, however, means other things besides wish
for or desire; for example, it may mean to be in need of, or to
have proper use for.8 Suppose the buyer had meant, when he
promised to buy all the pig-iron he might want during the period
stated, that he would ,buy what he was in need of or had a proper
use for. Would he then have been privileged to do as he pleased?
He would, said the court with some emphasis, in Tarbox v.
Gotzian9 within the year after Bailey v. Ausitrian was de-
cided. In that case Gotzian, who was engaged in the sale of boot
5
"The common or normal meaning of language will be given to the
words of a contract unless the circumstances show that in a particular case
a special meaning should be attached to it." New Amsterdam Casualty
Company, (1907) 102 Minn. 186, 189, 112 N. W. 1065. 1 Williston on Con-
tracts, sec. 618.6Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language,
p. 2674.7Crane v. C. Crane & Co., (1901) 105 Fed. 869, 45 C.C.A. 96; Cold
Blast Transp. Co. v. Kansas City Bolt & Nut Co., (1902) 152 C.C.A. 25,
114 Fed. 77, 57 L. R. A. 696; A. Santaella & Co. v. Otto F. Lange Co.,(1907) 155 Fed. 719, 84 C.C.A. 145; Higbie v. Rust, (1904) 112 Ill. App.
218, affirmed, 211 Ill. 333, 71 N. E. 1010; Hoffman v. Maffioli, 104 Wis.
630, 80 N. W. 1032, 47 L. R. A. 427. 1 Williston on Contracts, sec. 104.8Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language
(1923), p. 2674.
9(1873) 20 Minn. 139 (Gil. 122).
DOCTRINE OF BAILEY v. AUSTRIAN
and shoe packs, exchanged his promise to buy for Tarbox's prom-
ise to sell all the boot and shoe packs which Gotzian should
require in his business during a certain season at specified prices,
etc. Tarbox furnished a quantity of boot and shoe packs, but
eventually refused to supply any more notwithstanding Gotzian's
urgent requests. At the trial Gotzian offered evidence to prove
these facts, but it was rejected and this action was sustained by
the supreme court. Speaking through the same justice who had
voiced -the opinion in Bailey v. Austrian, the court said:
. ..We are of opinion that the ruling was right accord-
ing to the doctrine of Bailey v. Austrian. There is the same
want of 'absolute mutuality of engagement' in this instance as
there was in that. The agreement . . . was not a binding
and valid contract."
Now the dictionary to which we have referred says that
require means to have imperative need of; to find indispensable,"
and hence is even a stronger word than want when that word is
defined to mean to be in need of or to have proper itse for.
If, as the court says, there is the same want of mutuality in
Tarbox v. Gotzian that there was in Bailey v. Austrian, we may
be permitted to inject the meaning of the word require into the
doctrine of Bailey v. Austrian; and we may then be warranted
in stating the doctrine thus:
A promise to buy all of a certain commodity which a biayer
,may have imperative need of or may find indispensable in his
business during a specified period of time and at specified prices
does not furidsh sufficient consideration to support the seller's
promise to sell.
Most authorities elsewhere have not doubted the opposite con-
clusion.:"
1OFunk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage (1923), p. 2090.
I"Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., (1903) 58
C.C.A. 220, 61 L. R. A. 402, 121 Fed. 298; Lima Locomotive & M. Co. v.
National Steel C. Co., (1907) 155 Fed. 77, 83 C.C.A. 593, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.)
713; Smith v. Morse, (1868) 20 La. Ann. 220; Hickory v. O'Brien, (1900)
123 Mich. 611, 82 N. W. 241, 49 L, R. A. 594, 81 A. S. R. 227; Wells v.
Alexandre et al., (1891) 130 N. Y. 642, 15 L. R A. 218, 29 N. E. 142; Na-
tional Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., (1884) 110 Ill. 427; Minnesota
Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., (1895) 160 Ill. 85, 43 N. E. 774. See
Ames-Brooks Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co.. (1901) 83 M:nn. 346, 86 N. W. 344;
Scott v. T. AV. Stevenson Co., (1915) 130 Minn. 151, 153 N. V. 316; City
of Marshall v. Kalman, (1923) 153 Minn. 320, 190 N. W. 597; Trainor v.
Buchanan Coal Co., (1923) 154 Minn. 204, 191 N. W. 431; 1 Williston on
Contracts, sec. 104. In Scott v. T. W. Stevenson Co., (1915) 130 Minn.
151, 159, 153 N. W. 316, the Court said: "In many lines of business it has
become common in late years for those engaged therein to contract in ad-
vance, at specified prices for such quantity of materials or of goods as
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Let us try to isolate the flaw which caused the buyer's
promise in Bailey v. Ausirian to fail as a "positive agree-
ment" or an "absolute engagement." If the buyer had
promised to buy ten thousand tons, or ten thousand tons more
or less, of pig-iron from the seller, other terms and conditions
remaining the same, there can be no doubt that this promise
would have furnished sufficient consideration to support the
seller's promise to sell. It must, therefore, have been thought by
the court that what the buyer's promise lacked was certainty;
yet, unless the court shut its eyes to the extrinsic facts of the
case, this conclusion could not logically have been reached since
the dimensions of the buyer's promise could easily have been
measured 'by the objective requirements of his business. Cer-
turn est quod certum reddi potest. The surrounding circum-
stances and the situation of the parties, at the time the exchange
of promises occurred, show the nature of the agreement which
they supposed they were making to be a contract for the pur-
chase and sale of the ascertainable or determinable amount of
pig-iron which the buyer's foundry .vould normally use or con-
sume during the period specified. If this assumption is well-
founded no good reason can be given why the result should not
have been a binding bilateral contract so far as the requirements
of the doctrine of consideration are concerned.
Suppose, however, that we eliminate the certainty which
flows from the fact that the buyer is engaged in a well-established
business which uses or consumes the commodity in question in
the manufacture of its product. Say, for instance, that the
buyer is a jobber and that his demands will vary with the fluctu-
ation of trade conditions. Will his promise to buy all the pig-
iron he may require involve the kind of benefit or detriment
necessary to support the seller's promise to sell? Clearly in this
situation we cannot easily infer that the buyer means to bind
himself to take an ascertainable or determinable quantity of pig-
iron. On the contrary, with no foundry to reduce his wants to a
may be needed in such business during a specified period of time. Where
such contracts are supported by a consideration other than the mutual
promises of the parties, their validity is beyond question. Where the only
consideration for the promise to sell is the promise of the buyer to pur-
chase such quantity as he may need, the authorities are not unanimous,
but the decided weight of authority is to the effect that, if the buyer has an
established business whose requirements may be estimated approximately,
the contract is not void either for uncertainty or want of mutuality; but
is valid and may be enforced to the extent of the ordinary requirements
of such business when carried on and conducted in the manner contem-
plated by the parties at the time of making such contract."
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certainty, it is more reasonable to infer that he did not intend to
bind himself to buy any qiuantity of pig-iron whatever. Yet, mani-
festly, the parties intended their negotiations to have some bind-
ing effect; otherwise, they would not have engaged in them.
What did they intend to accomplish by making this agreement?
The intention of the buyer is this: If a demand is made upon
him for pig-iron he wants to be able to buy as much of that com-
modity as he will need to fill it at a price known in advance;
if there is no demand he does not want to be obliged to take
and pay for any pig-iron. To place himself in this advantageous
position, he must obtain from the seller an offer to sell any
quantity he may order within the period specified. But, assuming
that he can obtain such an offer, he cannot safely rely upon it
unless in some way he can deprive the seller of his power of
revocation. This result can be accomplished, at least to the ex-
tent of imposing a duty upon the seller not to revoke his offer,
by giving some consideration to the seller for keeping his offer
open. The consideration given may in general take the form of
action or forbearance, depending largely upon what the seller
expressly or impliedly requests. Under the circumstances of the
present case the consideration for the seller's promise to keep his
offer open consists in forbearance on the part of the buyer,
since by promising to buy from the seller all the pig-iron he may
want in his business during the period specified, the buyer in-
ferentially agrees that he will refrain from buying any pig-iron
elsewhere during that period. Thus by fettering his freedom of
action the buyer clearly sustains the kind of detriment which the
doctrine of consideration requires, and he thereby secures the
option which he seeks. 12
At what cost to the seller himself is the option to the buyer
given? Is it more than the seller will be willing to pay? The
121n Koehler & Hinrichs Company v. Illinois Glass Co. (1919) 143
Minn. 344, 173 N. W. 703, where the buyer contracted to buy twelve car-
loads of flasks, etc., and the contract contained a further clause by which
the buyer should have "the privilege of increasing quantity as much as
they may desire at price shown herein during the period covered by this
contract," in upholding the validity of the option the court said: "This
court is now definitely committed to the rule that if the party holding an
option under a contract has bought his option. for value paid or absolutely
agreed to be paid, he may enforce it."
"One test of the applicability of Bailey v. Austrian to such a contract
as we have here is whether the buyer has so bound himself that he has
lost the right to buy from whomsoever he pleases. If his freedom to con-
tract has been fettered by the acceptance of the seller's proposal, a bindine
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dire consequences which may follow the making of this kind
of offer have been stated substantially as follows: If the price of
pig-iron rises, the buyer will, by that much, increase his ratio of
profits, and probably, coming into a situation to outbid competi-
tors, increase, also, the quantum of orders; if, on the other
hand, prices fall below the range of profits, the orders can be
wholly discontinued. On the contrary, the situation of the seller
is this: Should prices fall, he cannot 'compel the buyer to give
further orders; but, should prices rise, the orders sent in will be
compulsory, and the loss will be measured, both by the increase
of the ratio of profits, and the probable increase of the quantutm
of orders. 13
This dark -prospect is based upon the assumption that the
only advantage which accrues to the seller in marketing his
product is that which arises out of the price at which the product
is sold. The truth of the matter is that advantages may come from
any part of the production and marketing process, and that the
price at which the goods are sold is only one factor to be con-
sidered in deciding whether a given contract should be entered
into. In the first place, it is not entirely certain that the buyer
will discontinue his orders, even though the price at which he
must sell the goods drops below the contract price with the seller.
He may have connections in his trade which he desires to main-
tain, even at the financial loss which buying at a higher and
selling at a lower price entails. He must either buy from the
seller or abandon entirely that branch of his business which
concerns the subject-matter of the particular contract. Usually
he will hesitate to do this unless the decline in price is great and
the depression prolonged. Thus, in the normal case, the seller
is assured of the -business of the buyer, irrespective of downward
price fluctuations. In the second place, the effect of the option
is to narrow by one buyer the field of competition among possible
sellers, and -to that extent the energies of the marketing organiza-
tion of the particular seller are conserved. This may result in
lower costs of marketing or in intensifying competition as to
buyers remaining in the field. In this way the seller enjoys a
decided factual benefit which tends to mitigate whatever hard-
contract results." City of Marshall v. Kalman, (1922), 153 Minn. 320, 325.
190 N. W. 597.
13 Crane et al v. C. Crane & Co., (1901) 105 Fed. 869, 872, 45 C.C.A.
96.
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ship may come from being forced to fill orders at a price lower
than the market.
From what has been said, the importance of whether or not
the buyer is engaged in a well-established business is apparent.
On this fact the nature of the obligation assumed by each of the
parties depends. If his business is well-established and uses or
consumes pig-iron in the manufacture of its product, the promises
exchanged are not lacking in mutuality, because the seller binds
himself to sell and the buyer binds himself -to take and pay for
that quantity which a foundry like the buyer's would, subject to
some slight variation from year to year, use or consume under
normal conditions. Even if the buyer increased his production,
without adding to the size or capacity of his plant, he could not
look to the seller to furnish the pig-iron required to make this
increase possible. Where, however, the buyer is a jobber, and.
therefore, has no requirements which are ascertainable or de-
terminable on the basis of use or consumption in the manufacture
of a product, his obligation extends no further than his duty to
refrain from buying pig-iron from any one other than the seller;
and the seller's obligation is merely to keep his offer open. The
performance required of each party is entirely negative in char-
acter, and it becomes affirmative only when the buyer sends in an
order. This, however, results in the formation of a new and
distinct contract between the parties which is not open to any of
the objections we have been considering.
That such option contracts are desirable is evidenced by the
fact that they have the sanction of trade usage." This would
':4Cement Mffrs.' Protective Ass'n. et al. v. United States, (1925) 268
U. S. 588 69 L. Ed. 1104, 45 Sup. Ct. 586: "The specific job contract
is a form of contract in common use by manufacturers of cement
whereby cement is sold for future delivery for use in a specific piece
of construction which is described in the contract . . . they arc
contracts 'whereby a manufacturer is to deliver in the future, cement
to ibe used in a specific piece of work, such as a particular building
or road, and the obligation is that the manufacturer shall furnish and
the contractor shall take only such cement as is required for or used
for the specific purpose.' These contracts have, by universal practice, been
treated by cement manufacturers as, in effect, free options customarily
made and acted upon on the understanding that the purchaser is to pay
nothing until after the delivery of the cement to him; that he is not
obligated in any event to take the cement contracted for unless he chooses
to; that he is not held to the price named in the contract in the event of a
decline in the market price; whereas the manufacturer may be held to
the contract price if the market advances and may be held for the delivery
of the full amount of cement required for the completion of the particular
piece of construction described in the contract. The practical effect and
operation of the specific job contract therefore is to enable contractors
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not 'be true if they did not facilitate to some extent the marketing
process. For this reason a proper administration of justice does
not permit a court to render the negotiations of the parties in-
operative where there is a way by which they may be upheld.
If the assumption can now be made that the court erred in
holding that there was no contract between the parties in Bailcy
v. Austrian, we may turn our attention to the point at which the
error in its reasoning occurred. The method by which the court
reached its conclusion was the method of deductive logic. Find-
ing the major premise of its syllogism ready made in the form
of a text-book statement, it sought to apply that generalization to
the case in hand. If the buyer's promise embodied a positive
agreement there was a contract; if not, there was no contract.
It does not seem to have occurred to any one connected with the
case that this was an issue which could be settled only by mar-
shalling the facts concerning the promise. Whether or not the
failure to develop the facts was due to oversight of counsel or to
a ,belief on the part of the court that no evidence other than the
bare promises of the parties was admissible need not be con-
sidered. It is enough to say that the court was forced to take
a partial view because it lacked the data upon which the solution
of the problem before it depended. Under the circumstances it
is not strange that the promises of the parties, divorced as they
were from their background, meant little or nothing.
In the light of subsequent cases, the failure of the court in
Bailey v. Autstrian to look high and low for the facts appears to
have been more accidental than anything else. These cases clear-
ly show that the court is not committed to the idea that there can
be no contract unless the promises of the parties are expressly
stated in unambiguous language. On the contrary, in many of
the cases where the doctrine of Bailey v. Austrian has been in-
voked and has been held inapplicable, the supposed agreement
was more or less artlessly drawn. 15 In general these cases show
that the court has looked through form to substance; that it has
not been misled 'by the mold in which the contract has been cast;
who are bidding upon construction work to secure a call or option for
the cement required for the completion of that particular job at a price
which may not be increased, but may be reduced if the market declines.
It enables contractors to bid for future construction work with the assur-
ance that the requisite cement will be available at a definitely ascertained
maximum price."
15Beyerstedt v. Winona Mill Co., (1892) 49 Minn. 1, 51 N. W. 619, is
extreme in this respect.
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and that it will make an exhaustive effort to discover all the facts
before it will say that the negotiations of the parties have been
fruitless. Thus, the promise of one party may necessarily be im-
plied from the express promise of the other ;" or it may be im-
plied from action taken by such party in view of and in reliance
on the express promise of the other ;1 or, if neither of the prom-
loMinneapolis Mill Company v. Goodnow, (1889) 40 Minn. 497, 42
N. W. 356. The written agreement between the parties provided that
"the Minneapolis Mill Company agrees to saw for said John Goodnow
. . during the summer of 1887, six million feet or more of pine
logs . . . as shall be directed from time to time by said John Goodnow
or his agent" . . . and it was claimed that the case was analogous to
Bailey v. Austrian (1873) 19 Minn. 535 and Tarbox v. Gotzian (1873) 20
Minn. 139. But the court found otherwise. After stating that in those
cases there was no consideration-to sustain the contract because one party
had not promised or undertaken to do anything, the court said: "There is
this marked difference between this agreement and those in the cases
referred to, that here there is a specified amount provided for, instead
of leaving it, as in the Bailey case, to what the plaintiff 'might want'; or,
as in the Tarbox case, to what the defendant 'should require.' There is in
this agreement no express promise on the part of Goodnow to furnish,
for plaintiff to saw, the 6,000,000 feet of logs which the plaintiff is to saw
for him and as he shall direct. But that is necessarily implied. How
could it saw the logs as he should direct, unless he should furnish them?
There can be little doubt, as the parties understood this agreement when
they executed it, Goodnow was thereby engaging to furnish the 6,000,000
feet of logs for plaintiff to saw, and plaintiff was engaging to saw them
in the manner and at the prices specified. A third party would so under-
stand it."
l7Lapham v. Flint, (1902) 86 Minn. 376, 90. N. W. 780: Defendant
owned real estate which he desired to sell; and with that end in view he
executed and delivered to plaintiff the following instrument:
"For value received, I hereby constitute you my sole agent, until the
first day of May, 1902, to sell the following described real estate for the
price and upon the terms herein set forth . . In case of your procur-
ing a responsible purchaser I agree to . . . pay you as commission
I also agree to give standard commission in lieu of above
should I'find a purchaser myself. Dated at St. Paul, Minn., the 26th day
of April, 1901.-Henry A. Flint."
The complaint alleged defendant's execution of the contract, and its
delivery to plaintiff; that, after delivery, plaintiff listed the property for
sale, and at various times advertised and endeavored to sell it; and that
thereafter on August 28, 1901, defendant personally sold the property but
refused to pay plaintiff the agreed commission. Defendant filed a general
demurrer to this complaint, contending that the contract was nilateral
upon its face; that it contained no engagement or promise on plaintiff's
part to do any act; and that it was, therefore, not binding. In overruling
the demurrer and sustaining the complaint, the court said: ". . . in
the case before us, conceding that the contract, upon its face, was uni-
lateral, and does not express mutuality of agreement, yet the complaint
alleged that, after the delivery of the contract respondent performed serv-
ices in pursuance thereof, by listing and advertising the property, and
endeavoring to sell it. This allegation is sufficient to support evidence
of acceptance by the agent. If in fact the agent proceeded in good faith
to carry out the terms of the agreement, advertised the property, and
endeavored to find a purchaser for it, according to the written terms,
that would constitute an acceptance."
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ises is expressly stated in writing or otherwise, both may be in-
ferred from a previous course of dealing or from contemporane-
ous surrounding circumstances and the situation of the parties
at the time the supposed agreement was made.18
IsBeyerstedt v. Winona Mill Co., (1892) 49 Minn. 1, 51 N. W. 619.
Defendant operated a flour mill at Winona. In the same city were several
saw mills about which large quantities of sawdust, etc., accumulated dur-
ing each running season. Prior to the year 1890, written contracts had
been entered into between the plaintiff and defendant, under which plain-
tiff furnished and delivered at the flour mill, and defendant received and
used for fuel, the refuse accumulation of sawdust from at least one saw-
mill. On March 20, 1890, the parties signed the following writing:
"It is hereby agreed between the Winona Mill Company and Chas.
Beyerstedt that the latter is to receive for hauling, during tile season of
eighteen hundred and ninety, (1890), twenty-five (25) cents per load for
sawdust from Empire Lumber Company's Mill, and thirty (30) cents per
load for sawdust, and forty (40) cents per load in double boxes for shav-
ings, from Winona Lumber Company's Mill, all delivered at our mill.
All loads to be full boxes, and size of boxes same as old contract calls for."
Plaintiff soon afterwards commenced to deliver from the two mills
mentioned and defendant to receive and pay for sawdust, and such de-
livery, receipt, and payment continued until defendant's mill was destroyed
by fire. Having no further use for fuel, defendant then refused to receive
any more sawdust and plaintiff sued for breach of contract, alleging that
he had agreed to furnish and deliver and defendant had agreed to accept
and receive, the entire accumulation of sawdust of the sawmills men-
tioned for and during the season of 1890. At the trial the court, after
the writing of March 20 had been put in evidence, allowed parol testimony
as to the terms and conditions of the contract to be introduced, and
thereafter instructed the jury that such evidence could be taken into
consideration in determining what the contract really was. Plaintiff
obtained a verdict and defendant appealed on the ground that the court
erred in permitting the parol evidence to be received and considered by thejury. The supreme court, however, affirmed the action of the trial court.
After referring to the fact that the writing signed by the parties imposed
no obligation upon the plaintiff to deliver, and upon the defendant to
receive a single load of sawdust, and that it, therefore, seemed nonenforce-
able, if either party had declined to act upon it, the court said:
"The proposition of the court below that this writing, on its face, was
either invalid . . . or was an incomplete an imperfect obligation, not
containing the entire contract . . .seems to be correct. If invalid
upon its face, the real contract between the parties could be shown by
parol; ... and if incomplete and imperfect upon its face, the consider-
ation and meaning thereof not being ascertainable, except by intrisic oral
evidence, such evidence was admissible for that purpose. . . . From the
proofs it appeared, without objection, that plaintiff had contracted for or
purchased the entire output of sawdust and shavings of the sawmills for
the season of 1890, that he might supply the defendant; that the entire
quantity was needed by it for fuel during the year; and that the articles
could not be allowed to accumulate at the saw mills. It also appeared
that for several years prior to 1890 the plaintiff and defendant had entered
into and fulfilled contracts of the import and character of that set forth
in the complaint herein, and that these old contracts were in mind and
referred to by both parties, when, on March 20, 1890, the making of a
new one was being considered, and that one of these contracts was men-
tioned, and, as to the size of the loads, actually made a part of the writing
of that date. This testimony defined the nature and quantity of the sub-ject-matter. It showed the situation and relation of the parties, and the
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One case deserves particular mention, namely, Amncs-Brooks
Conipany v. Aetna. Insurance Company.19  In that case plaintiff
had been engaged for many years in shipping grain by water
from Duluth to Buffalo and the lower lake ports, and its -business
was an old and well-established one. Incident thereto, it was
necessary for it to secure a large amount of marine insurance
on cargoes during each season of navigation. For several years
prior to 1899, the practice had been for the general agent of de-
fendants to come to Duluth about the close of the season and
arrange with -plaintiff for its insurance business for the then
ensuing year. According to this established custom, the parties
had in the fall of 1898 reached an agreement covering the season
of 1899, but before navigation opened in that year rates for ma-
rine insurance were advanced and defendants refused to insure
plaintiff's cargoes at the rates of premium provided for. After
some dispute it was finally agreed that defendants should carry
the insurance for 1899 at certain stipulated rates, but without
prejudice to plaintiff's claim for damages for breach of the al-
leged contract to insure at 1898 rates. When suit was brought
it was urged that the negotiations of the parties at the close of
the year 1898 had not resulted in a contract for two reasons:
first, because no certain terms had been agreed upon; and sec-
ond, because there was no mutuality of obligation. The court
held for the plaintiff, saying:
"In considering this question whether such a contract is
sufficiently definite to be effective, a proper administration of
justice will not permit us to be oversubtle, but we must interpret
the contract from the standpoint of the practical business men
who made it, which was the contract of 1898, and the established
course of business between them. So construing the alleged con-
tract, we hold it to be sufficiently definite in its terms to support
an action for damages for its breach. The property to ,be in-
sured was definite, for it was all of the plaintiff's cargoes of
grain to Buffalo and the lower lake ports during the season of
1899. The amount of the premiums was ascertainable without
any further contract, for they were to be based on the rates
and classifications of the vessels carrying the cargoes as deter-
mined by the contract of 1898 and its execution, and the amount
of insurance on each cargo would be determined in the same
manner ...
meaning of some of the terms used, if we regard the writing as imperfect
and incomplete."
'9(1901) 83 Minn. 346, 86 N. W. 344.
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"It is also urged by defendant that the alleged contract was
void, because there was no mutuality of obligation, in that the
plaintiff did not bind itself to have any cargoes to be insured,
and was at liberty, if it did have any, to insure them or not, as it
pleased. If this be the correct interpretation of the supposed
contract, it was not binding upon either party. Bailey v. Austrian,
19 Minn. 465 (535); Tarbox v. Gotzian, 20 Minn. 122 (139);
Stensgaard v. Smith, 43 Minn. 11, 44 N. W. 669. In the cases
cited there was no mutuality of obligation, for the promises were
all on one side. In this respect they are distinguishable from this
case, where the plaintiff was engaged in an established business,
of which the insurance of its cargoes was a part; and the plain-
tiff, as the evidence tends to show, absolutely promised the de-
fendants that they should have such insurance for the year 1899
on all of its cargoes to Buffalo and lower lake ports, and they,
in turn, promised to write the insurance upon the terms of the
1898 contract. This presupposed the continuance of the plaintiff
in business for the year 1899, and included by necessary intend-
ment a promise on its part not to give such insurance to any other
party. This was a sufficient consideration for the defendant's
promise."
This case is noteworthy because it shows how far from the
doctrine of Bailey v. Austrian the drift toward the opposite pole
has been, the statement of the court to the contrary notwith-
standing. The evidential value of every scrap of data is fully
appreciated by the court. It no longer contents itself with mak-
ing a literal interpretation of the language used by the parties to
express their agreement; but by resorting to extrinsic fact and
exhausting its possibilities the intent and purpose of the parties
is 'brought to light when otherwise it must have remained unas-
certainable.2
0
While the soundness of the general principle applied in
Bailey v. Austrian has not been questioned by the court, it is no
longer blindly applied.2 1 Some sort of contract results from ne-
20 "The questions presented by these contentions may not be entirely
free from doubt if, in the consideration of the contract, we were confined
to what appears in the writing. We are not so confined. We look, not
only to the language employed, but to the subject-matter, the course of
dealing between the parties, and all the relevant surrounding circumstances.
The court is not shut out from the light which the parties enjoyed when
the contract was made. In determining the meaning of the words used
and the intention of the parties, we place ourselves in the situation of
the parties, so as to view the circumstances as they viewed them. In this
way we endeavor to get at the correct application of the language to the
things described and at the real intention of the parties." T. B. Walker
Mfg. Co. v. Swift & Co., (1912) 200 Fed. 529, 531.
21"This court has often considered . . . Bailey v. Austrian. No
exception can be taken to the statement of the abstract legal principle set
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gotiations of the kind involved in that case, and the hope may
not, therefore, be unwarranted that eventually on a proper oc-
casion the doctrine will be characterized as an archaism in the
law of this state.
forth in the opinion. But it is not a legal formula to be blindly applied
to every contract which seems on its face to lack mutuality of obligation."
City of Marshall v. Kalman, (1922) 153 Minn. 320, 324, 190 N. W. 597.
